Elaine Jenkins v. Alan Jenkins, Trustee, D.U. Company, Inc, Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Elaine Jenkins v. Alan Jenkins, Trustee, D.U.
Company, Inc, Davis County Cooperative Society,
Inc. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell A. Cline; Crippen & Cline; Attorneys for Appellee.
Carl E. Kingston; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 20070061 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/37
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELAINE JENKINS, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U. 
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY 
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC., 
Appellant/Defendants. 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
vs. 
ELAINE JENKINS, LOREN JENKINS, 
STANLEY JENKINS and JEREMIAH 
JENKINS, 
Appellees/Defendants. 
Case No. 20070061-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Carl E. Kingston 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Appellant Alan 
Jenkins, Trustee 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Elaine 
Jenkins 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELAINE JENKINS, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U. 
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY 
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC., 
Appellant/Defendants. 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
vs. 
ELAINE JENKINS, LOREN JENKINS, 
STANLEY JENKINS and JEREMIAH 
JENKINS, 
Appellees/Defendants. 
Case No. 20070061-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Carl E. Kingston 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Appellant Alan 
Jenkins, Trustee 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Elaine 
Jenkins 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Bearden vs. Wardlev Corporation. 72 P.3d 144, ftnt 4 (Utah 2003) 24 
Black vs. McKnight. 562 P.2d 621, 621 (Utah 1977) 27 
Booth v. Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. Inc.. 20 P.3d 319 (Utah 2000) 15 
Conder v. Hunt. 1 P.3d 558 (UT 2000) 34 
Cox v. State. 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah App. 1988) 23 
Elaine Jenkins vs. Samuel Walton Jenkins, Civil No. 964905253 (Utah 
3rdDist. Ct.) 7 
Macris & Associates. Inc. v. Newavs. Inc.. 16 P.3d 1214, 1222 (Utah 2000) 17, 31 
Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment. Inc.. 174 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2007) 13, 24, 28 
Orton vs. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998) 14, 16, 27 
Park vs. Zions First National Bank. 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) 36 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 48 P.3d 941, 944 (Utah 2002) 15 
Ravarino v. Price. 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953) 17 
Robinson vs. All-Star Delivery. Inc.. 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999) 29, 33 
Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370, ^ 8, 995 P.2d 14 24 
State v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) 25 
State v. James. 174 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Utah App. 2007) 24 
State v. Stringham. 17 P.3d 1153. 1157 (Utah App. 2001) 23 
State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah App. 1993) 23, 29 
Summerill v. Shipley. 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995) 23 
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co.. 2 P.2d 107 (Utah 1931) 34 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (conU 
CASES (conU PAGE 
Tingevv.Christensen. 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999) 23 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) 20, 34 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(c)(2) 21 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(j) 25 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 24, 25 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9) 24 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 34 
18 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedures § 4443, at 382 (1981) 19 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 13 
H THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
ALAN JENKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 
A. Plaintiffs Claims Were Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds. 14 
B. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Barred by the Doctrine of Issue 
Preclusion. 17 
(T) No "identity of issues." 18 
(ii) Not competently, fully and fairly litigated. 19 
E THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ALAN 
JENKINS' MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO 
INCLUDE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE. 20 
Ed. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING ALAN 
JENKINS JURY INSTRUCTIONS 23 
A. Standard of Review. 23 
B. Failure to Adequately Brief. 24 
C. Refusal to Give the Requested Instructions was not 
Reversible Error 25 
1. Four Statute of Frauds instructions 25 
(i) Inapplicable 26 
(ii) Misstates the law 27 
(iii) Unnecessary 27 
(iv) Covered in other instructions. 28 
(v) No prejudice. 29 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (conO 
2. Two Estoppel Jury Instruction 30 
(i) Inapplicable, 31 
(ii) Misstates the law 31 
(iii) No prejudice 32 
3. Statute of Limitations Instructions 33 
(i) Inapplicable 34 
(ii) Misstates the law 34 
(iii) No prejudice. 35 
4. Adverse possession instruction 35 
(i) Inapplicable 35 
(ii) Misstates the law 36 
(iii) No prejudice. 37 
CONCLUSION 37 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 38 
ADDENDUM A 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-
3(2)0); 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellee does not object to Appellant's statement of issues. Appellee does object to 
Appellant's statement of the applicable standards of review for issue one (denial of 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment) and issue three (failure to give certain 
requested Jury instructions.) The proper standard of review for those issues is included in 
the discussion of each of those issues below. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involved a quiet title action by Elaine Jenkins against Alan Jenkins, D.U. 
Company and the Davis County Cooperative Society. D.U. Company was dismissed from 
the action on its own motion, since D.U. Company claimed no interest in the property. At 
trial, the Davis County Cooperative Society disclaimed any interest in the property. As 
between Elaine Jenkins and Alan Jenkins, the owner of record of the property, a Jury found 
in favor of Elaine Jenkins. Based on the Jury's verdict the property was quieted in the name 
of Elaine Jenkins and Sam Jenkins (Elaine Jenkins' deceased husband), as against any 
interest by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis County Cooperative Society. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1« Elaine Jenkins was raised in an economic system under which all "income" 
and "property" of the members were held "in common" (the "Order.") R.384, p.45. 
2. As a teenager and during her early 20s, Elaine Jenkins worked for at least eight 
businesses owned by or affiliated with the Order. R.384,1 p. 37-43. 
3. Elaine Jenkins did not receive a paycheck for work performed at any of those 
businesses, but instead received each month a number of "units" credited to her "account" 
with the Davis County Cooperative Society, an entity that was part of the Order.2 R. 384, 
p. 39. 
4. "Units" were equivalent to "cash." R. 384, p. 52 
5. Having "units" on deposit in your account was like having cash in a "savings 
account," that was available to "spend on something." R. 384, p. 2. 
6. One way Elaine Jenkins (and other members of the Order) could spend those 
"units" by going to "another business that was owned by the [Order], buy[ing] whatever 
goods they had there, or services, and it was debited off of [her] statement." R. 384, p. 39. 
7. Each month Elaine Jenkins would receive a "statement" from the Davis 
County Cooperative Society that showed the number "units" that she had earned for that 
Elaine Jenkins worked for Velanz Manufacturing Company (as a seamstress), Imperial 
Market (as a clerk and cashier), Shoppers Discount (as a clerk), Co-op Department Store (as 
manager of the shoe department), a potato farm in Idaho (moving pipes and weeding), orchards 
(picking fruit), East Gate Publishing Company and East Side Market. R. 384, p. 37-43. 
2The number of units "credited" to Elaine Jenkins' account each month was based on the 
number of hours worked. R. 384, p. 39. When a member of the Order worked for a business that 
was not affiliated with the Order, the money earned from that business was turned over to the 
Davis County Cooperative Society and credited to the member's account. R. 384, p. 44. For 
example, when Elaine Jenkins worked for The Burnham Gun Club, a business not affiliated with 
the Order, all of the money that she earned was given to the Davis County Cooperative Society, 
and then "credited to [Elaine Jenkins] on [her] statement." R. 384, p. 44. 
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month and the number of "units" spent.3 R. 384, p. 39. 
8. Sam Jenkins was also a member of the Order. R. 382, p. 42. 
9. In 1975, Sam and Elaine Jenkins were married. R. 384, p. 50. 
10. After their marriage, Sam and Elaine Jenkins continued to receive monthly 
statements from the Davis County Cooperative Society that showed the number of "units" 
credited to and the number of "units" debited from their account each month. R. 384, p. 49. 
11. At trial, Elaine Jenkins introduced copies of thirty-three (33) monthly 
statements that she and Sam Jenkins had received from the Davis County Cooperative 
Society, between September 1979 and July 1996. R. 384, p. 49. See Plaintiffs Exhibit I. 
12. After their marriage, Sam and Elaine Jenkins decided to purchase a home in 
Woods Cross, Utah (the "Woods Cross House"). R. 384, p. 52. 
13. The purchase price was $40,000. R. 384, p. 52. 
14< When Sam and Elaine Jenkins bought the Woods Cross House, they paid for 
3Each statement included a list of "service slip deposits" and "service slip expenses" for 
the month. A "service slip deposit" reflected a specific transaction pursuant to which a certain 
number of units were credited to the account, such as "units" for work performed at a business 
affiliated with the Order. A "service slip expense" reflected a specific transaction pursuant to 
which a number of units were debited from the account. Each statement also listed the number 
of "units used" and "units owned." "Units used" reflected the number of "units" converted to 
physical assets that belonged to the member, such as furniture, a vehicle or a house. "Units 
owned" was the number of "units used" plus the number of "units" on deposit in the account. If 
the number of "units owned" was greater than the number of "units used," then the member had a 
positive balance, and the account accrued interest. If the number of "units owned" was less than 
the number of "units used" then the member had a negative balance and the member paid 
interest. R. 384, p. 47-52. 
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it with 40,000 "units" from their account.4 R. 384, p. 45. 
15. The closest statement Elaine Jenkins had prior to the purchase of the Woods 
Cross House was for September, 1979, which showed that the Jenkins had a credit of 
24,776.10 units. R. 384, p. 51-52. 
16. The closest statement Elaine Jenkins had after the purchase of the Woods 
Cross House was for November 1981, which showed the Jenkins had a debt of 7,969.16 
units. R. 384, p. 53. 
17. The difference between those two statements was accounted for by, among 
other things, the 40,000 units debited from the Jenkins5 account to purchase the Woods 
Cross House. R. 384, p. 53. 
18. When members of the Order purchased a home, they were "expected to turn 
the title [to home] over to [the Order] and allow [the Order] to put title in the name of one 
of their entities." R. 384, p. 37. 
19. The Woods Cross House was titled in the name of "Worldwide," one of the 
companies owned and operated by the Order. R. 384, p. 53-54. 
20. Each year, the Davis County Cooperative Society gave each member of the 
Order an "inventory" that listed all property owned by the member. R. 384, p. 55. 
21. The annual inventories for Sam and Elaine Jenkins for 1984 and 1985 each 
4The Woods Cross House was not owned by someone outside the Order. Therefore, the 
payment of the purchase price for the Woods Cross Home consisted of the transfer of the 40,000 
"units" from one account within the Davis County Cooperative Society (i.e., the Jenkins' 
account) to another account within the Davis County Cooperative Society. 
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listed a "House" valued at $40,000 as "Sam and Elaine Jenkins' Property." R. 384, p. 56-57. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, and Addendum A hereto. 
22. After they purchased the Woods Cross House, the property taxes for the 
Woods Cross House were debited from the Jenkins' account each year for payment of the 
property taxes on the Woods Cross House. R. 384, p. 65. See, e.g.. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 
($844.31 charged to the Jenkins' account in 1987 for "prop taxes 85 thru May 87.") 
23. Sam and Elaine Jenkins subsequently "decided that [they] needed a bigger 
house." R. 384, p. 57. 
24. The Jenkins asked Ortel Kingston, the leader of the Davis County Cooperative 
Society, if they could "trade the equity from the Woods Cross House [toward] another 
house; and he said [they] could." R. 384, p. 57. 
25. The Jenkins located a house at 1074 North Redwood Road (the "Redwood 
Road House"), and negotiated the purchase of that house for $50,000. R. 384, p. 57-59. 
26. The purchase price was paid by Sam and Elaine Jenkins, with $40,000 coming 
from their equity in the Woods Cross House and 10,000 "units" deducted from the Jenkins' 
account with the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 384, p. 61. 
27. When the Redwood Road House was purchased, it was titled in the name of 
"D.U. Company," a holding company owned and operated by the Order. R. 384, p. 60. See 
Warranty Deed from D. Gordon Berg to D.U. Company, Inc., dated November 31, 1986, 
Defendant's Exhibit 12. 
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28. Although the Redwood Road House was title in D.U. Company, Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins considered themselves to be the owners of the Redwood Road House and 
"were recognized as the actual owners" of the Redwood Road House by the members of the 
Order. R. 384, p. 54. 
29. Because Sam and Elaine Jenkins "paid for the house," it "actually belonged 
to them." R. 384, p. 55. 
30. The annual inventories that Elaine Jenkins introduced at trial for 1987, 1990, 
1994 and 1995, each listed the "House Redwood Road" valued at $50,000 as Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins' "Property." See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, attached hereto as Addendum A.5 R. 
384, p. 66-67. 
31 . The property taxes for the Redwood Road House were debited each year from 
the Jenkins5 account with the Davis County Cooperative Society. See, e.g.. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 6, which includes charge slip 7870, dated December 1, 1990, charging the Jenkins 
$1,019.17 for "property taxes," and charge slip 9100, dated December 31, 1997, charging 
the Jenkins $701.01 for "property taxes 1074 N Redwood." R. 384, p. 86. 
32. For a period of time the Jenkins moved to Idaho. R. 384, p. 67-68. 
33. During that period of time, the Jenkins rented the Redwood Road House to 
5The 1987 annual inventory listed both the Wood Cross House and the Redwood Road 
House as property belonging to the Jenkins. After purchasing the Redwood Road House, the 
Jenkins moved from the Woods Cross House to the Redwood Road House. However, the 
Jenkins "carried" both homes for a period of time before the Davis County Cooperative Society 
transferred the Woods Cross House off the Jenkins' inventory list. R. 384, p. 63-64. 
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Karen Bjorkman. R. 384, p. 68. 
34. Although Karen Bjorkman's rent was paid each month by "Salt Lake County 
Housing Authority" to D.U. Company, the full amount of the rent was credited back to the 
Jenkins on their monthly statements with the Davis County Cooperative Society since D.U. 
Company held title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins.6 R. 384, p. 
69-70. 
35. In 1996, Elaine Jenkins announced that she was leaving the Order. 
36. In 1996, Elaine Jenkins also commenced a divorce action against Sam Jenkins, 
captioned Elaine Jenkins vs. Samuel Walton Jenkins, Civil No. 964905253 (Utah 3rd Dist. 
Ct). 
37. On May 27, 1997, Elaine Jenkins signed a stipulation in that divorce 
proceeding that stated: 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho... 
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the 
course of the marriage. 
See Defendant's Exhibit 9. 
38. Prior to signing the stipulation, Elaine Jenkins asked her lawyer if signing the 
stipulation would affect her right to claim ownership of the Redwood Road House in the 
future, should the need arise. R. 384, p. 71. 
6The Salt Lake County Housing Authority would only pay rent to the record title holder of 
the Redwood Road House. 
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39. Based on that discussion, Elaine Jenkins understood that after signing the 
stipulation she would "still ha[ve] a right to pursue [a] claim" to the Redwood Road House 
in the future, if necessary. R. 384, p. 71-72. 
40. If Elaine Jenkins had understood otherwise, she would not have signed the 
stipulation. R. 384, p. 72. 
41. On August 6,1997, based on that signed stipulation, a Decree of Divorce was 
entered in the divorce action that provided: 
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho... 
12. The parties acquired no other real property during the 
course of the marriage. 
See Defendant's Exhibit 44. 
42. On August 24, 1997, Sam Jenkins died. 
43. After Sam's death, Elaine went to Paul Kingston, then the president of the 
Davis County Cooperative Society, and demanded that title to the Redwood Road House be 
deeded to her. R. 384, p. 72-73. 
44. During that conversation, Paul Kingston acknowledged that Elaine Jenkins 
owned the Redwood Road House, but refused to deed the Redwood Road House to Elaine 
Jenkins.7 R. 384, p. 72-73. 
45. Between May 15,1997 and June 20,1997, D.U. Company sent Elaine Jenkins 
7Instead of deeding the Redwood Road House to Elaine Jenkins, Paul Kingston wanted to 
buy the Redwood Road House back from Elaine for less than fair market value. This was 
unacceptable to Elaine Jenkins. R. 384, p. 73. 
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three letters, requesting that Elaine Jenkins sign a rental agreement, and threatening to evict 
her if she didn't do so. See Defendant's Exhibits 37, 39, and 40L R. 384, p. 79-80. 
46. Elaine Jenkins refused to do so, since she was the owner of the Redwood Road 
House. R. 384, pp. 73,78-79. 
47. Elaine Jenkins did not thereafter pay rent on the Redwood Road House (nor 
has she or Sam Jenkins ever paid rent on the Redwood Road House.) R. 384, p. 73. 
48. Elaine Jenkins continued to live in the Redwood Road House and treat the 
Redwood Road House as her own. R. 384, p. 73-75. 
49. The Jenkins maintained and repaired the Redwood Road House at their own 
expense - "Any time any thing broke we fixed it. Any repairs that were made were made by 
us." R. 384, p. 73-74. 
50. The Jenkins painted, re-carpeted, fixed the furnace, installed new linoleum, 
replaced the vanities, installed a sprinkler system and made other improvements to the 
Redwood Road House. R. 384, p. 74-75. 
51. Until 2005, D.U. Company did not interfere with Elaine Jenkins's occupancy 
of the Redwood Road House.8 R. 384, p. 73-79. 
52. On February 8,2005, D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan 
Jenkins, Sam Jenkins' brother, who was a member of the Order. R. 384, p. 79. 
8At the time Sam Jenkins died in 1997, the Jenkins had (or should have had) at least 
6,000 "units" on deposit with the Davis County Cooperative Society, to be used to pay property 
taxes on the Redwood Road House. R. 384, p. 82. 
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53. That sale was without the consent or knowledge of Elaine Jenkins. R. 384, 
p. 79. 
54. On February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a quiet title action against Alan 
Jenkins. 
5 5. Elaine Jenkins testified at trial, as well as four of her children (Stanley Jenkins, 
Samuel Jenkins, Rebecca Jenkins and Jesse Jenkins) and five former members of the Order 
(Merlin Kingston, Lynette Taylor, Rowenna Erickson, Connie Rugg and Dewey Peterson.) 
R. 384-386. 
56. The Jury found that, in 1986, D.U. Company had acquired title to the 
Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins: 
Q. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the 
time the property at 1074 Redwood Road was purchased on 
November 21, 1986 that Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. 
Company intended that D.U. Company hold legal title to that 
property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins? 
Yes X 
No 
See Special Verdict. R. 316-317. 
57. The Jury also found that at the time Alan Jenkins "purchased" the Redwood 
Road House from D.U. Company in 2005 he had notice that D.U. Company held title to the 
Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins: 
Q. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at 
the time Alan Jenkins purchased the property at 1074 Redwood 
10 
Road from D.U. Company in February, 2005, that Alan Jenkins 
had either actual or constrictive notice that D.U. Company held 
legal title to that property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine 
Jenkins? 
Yes ^ 
No 
See Special Verdict R. 316-317. 
58, On December 27, 2006, based on the Jury's findings, the trial court entered 
a Judgment quieting title to the Redwood Road House in the name of Sam Jenkins and 
Elaine Jenkins "free and clear of any liens or claims affecting title to the [Redwood Road 
House]"by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 368-
370. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Jury found that, at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in 1986, 
"Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company intended that D.U. Company hold legal title 
to [the Redwood Road House] for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins." The Jenkins paid 
the $50,000 purchase price for the Redwood Road House with 10,000 "units" on deposit in 
the Jenkins' account with the Davis County Cooperative Society and with $40,000 in equity 
from the Woods Cross House. The annual inventories maintained by Davis County 
Cooperative Society listed the Redwood Road House as property owned by Sam and Elaine 
Jenkins. Elaine Jenkins testified that she and Sam were the actual owners of the Redwood 
Road House. 
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In 2005, after D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins, 
Elaine Jenkins filed a quiet title action. The Jury found that Alan Jenkins, who was also a 
member of the Order, had notice of the Jenkins' ownership of the Redwood Road House. 
Based on the Jury's findings, the Court quieted title to the Redwood Road House in Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins name, as against any interest by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis 
County Cooperative Society. 
Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly denied. That issue is not 
appealable since the matter went to trial. The statute of frauds is inapplicable since the 
agreement to transfer the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of the 
Jenkins was fully performed in 1986. The fact that the Jenkins' interest in the Redwood 
Road House was not listed in the Divorce Decree did not bar Elaine Jenkins' claim under 
the doctrine of "issue preclusion." The issue as to ownership of the Redwood Road House 
in the divorce proceeding was not identical to the issue as to ownership of the Redwood 
Road House in this case. The issue as to ownership of the Redwood Road House in this case 
was also not "competently, fully and fairly litigated" in the divorce proceeding. 
Alan Jenkins' Motion to File Amended Answer was also properly denied. Alan 
Jenkins failed to transcribe the trial court's ruling on that motion, and for that reason alone 
the Alan Jenkins' appeal on that issue should be denied. 
Finally, the trial court properly refused to give the eight Jury instructions proposed 
by Alan Jenkins. Alan Jenkins failed to adequately brief the issue. The Jury instructions 
12 
proposed were inapplicable and misstated the law. There was also no reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome would have been different if the requested Jury instructions had been 
given. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Alan Jenkins claims the trial court errored in denying his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. However, where a motion for summary judgment is denied, and then there is a 
trial, the appellate court will not consider whether the trial court errored in denying the 
motion for summary judgment. Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment Inc., 174 P3d 1 (Utah 
App. 2007) (a denial of a motion for summaryjudgment is not appealable because "[a]t trial, 
[the moving party] had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary 
judgment motion." Id at ^ f 13 [citation omitted.]) In this case, Alan Jenkins may not appeal 
the trial court's denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment since there was subsequently 
a trial and Alan Jenkins had the opportunity to raise at trial the same issues raised in his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Even if the trial court's denial of Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
appealable (which it was not), the trial court did not error in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Alan Jenkins argued that 
Elaine Jenkins' quiet title action was barred by the statute of frauds and by the doctrine of 
"issue preclusion." Neither of those claims are correct. 
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A. Plaintiffs Claims Were Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court errored in failing to grant his Motion for 
Summary Judgment on grounds that Elaine Jenkins5 claim that D.U. Company held title to 
the Property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins was barred by the statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds states that "no estate or interest in property... shall be created, granted, 
assigned, [or] surrendered [except] in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same." Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-1. 
Alan Jenkins acknowledges that once a conveyance has been fully or partially 
completed, that transaction no longer falls within the statute of frauds. See Appellant's 
Brief, pg. 11 (arguing that "before that exception applies, there must be a showing of an 
agreement or contract to be performed."). See also, Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 
1998,) (holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a verbal agreement to transfer an 
interest in real property where there has been an (1) agreement, (2) part or full performance, 
and (3) reliance thereon.) 
However, Alan Jenkins argues that it is undisputed that there was no oral argument 
between D.U. Company and Elaine Jenkins pursuant to which D.U. Company agreed to hold 
title to the Property for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins and her husband and, therefore, Elaine 
Jenkins' claims were barred by the statute of frauds and the trial court erred in denying his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 15 ("Plaintiff did not allege or 
show that such an agreement or contract existed.") Alan Jenkins' assertion that there was 
14 
no material issue of fact as to the existence of an oral agreement between D.U. Company and 
the Jenkins is without merit. In her affidavit filed in opposition to Alan Jenkins' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Elaine Jenkins alleged that she and Sam Jenkins purchased the 
Redwood Road House with $40,000 in equity from the Woods Cross House and 10,000 
"units" on deposit with the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 129. She also averred 
that D.U. Company "held the Property for the benefit of myself and Sam Jenkins." R. 129. 
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, the appeals 
court will 'review the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.'" Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 48 P.3d 941, 944 (Utah 2002) 
quoting Booth v. Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. Inc.. 20 P.3d 319 (Utah 2000.) Elaine 
Jenkins' affidavit clearly disputes Alan Jenkins' claim that there was no oral agreement 
made between D.U. Company and Sam and Elaine Jenkins. Therefore, in reviewing the 
facts and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to Elaine Jenkins, the trial court 
did not err in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment because there was 
clearly a material issue of fact as to whether an oral agreement existed between Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in 
1986.. 
In this case, the agreement between Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D .U. Company was 
fully performed at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in 1986. At that time, 
Sam and Elaine Jenkins transferred $40,000 in equity from the Woods Cross Property and 
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10,000 "units" from their account with the Davis County Cooperative Society to pay the 
$50,000 purchase price for the Redwood Road Property. The monthly statements introduced 
by Elaine Jenkins at trial demonstrated that 40,000 units were deducted from the Jenkins' 
account at the time the Woods Cross House was purchased, and 10,000 units were deducted 
from the Jenkins5 account at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased. The annual 
inventory lists maintained by Davis County Cooperative showed the Woods Cross House 
as "property" owned by Sam and Elaine Jenkins and later showed the Redwood Road House 
as "property" owned by Sam and Elaine Jenkins. Documents introduced at trial also 
demonstrated that Sam and Elaine Jenkins' account with the Davis County Cooperative 
Society was debited annually to pay for property taxes on the Property.9 
The statute of frauds does not "undo" a transaction completed many years earlier 
simply because the transaction was not "subscribed" in writing at the time of the 
9A11 of the three requirements in Orton v. Carter were satisfied. There was an 
"agreement" - D.U. Company agreed to acquire and hold "legal title" to the Redwood 
Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins. There was "full or partial 
performance" of that agreement - the Jenkins "traded in" the Wood's Cross House (for a 
$40,000 equity trade) and had 10,000 in "units" deducted from their account to pay the 
purchase price of the Redwood Road House and D.U. Company acquired "legal title" to 
the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins. Finally, there was "reliance." 
The Jenkins paid the purchase price for the Redwood Road House. The Jenkins moved 
out of the Woods Cross House and into the Redwood Road House. 10,000 "units" were 
deducted from Sam and Elaine Jenkins' account to pay the balance of the purchase price 
for the Redwood Road House. The Jenkins paid the property taxes for the Redwood 
Road House (which were deducted from their account with the Davis County 
Cooperative Society.) The Jenkins lived in the Redwood Road House and maintained it 
and improved it and treated it as their own. 
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conveyance. In this case, the conveyance of the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company 
for the benefit of the Jenkins occurred in 1986. The dispute arose 19 years after that 
conveyance, when D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins. 
Alan Jenkins' reliance on Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953) is misplaced. 
That case involved an action for specific performance of a contract to sell land that 
defendant had promised to sign under certain conditions, but had not signed. Elaine Jenkins 
was not seeking specific performance of an oral agreement. Elaine Jenkins was seeking to 
quiet title to her beneficial interest in a conveyance that occurred 19 years earlier. 
In his brief, Alan Jenkins concedes that the full or partial performance exception to 
the statute of frauds applies in this case once Elaine Jenkins has alleged an oral agreement 
between her and D.U. Company. Alan Jenkins' claim that Elaine Jenkins failed to allege 
such an oral argument is without merit. 
B. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Barred by the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion. 
Alan Jenkins next claims that the statement in the 1997 Divorce Decree that Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins "owned no other real property" bars Elaine Jenkins, under the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, from now claiming an interest in the Redwood Road House. Two elements 
of the doctrine of issue preclusion are not satisfied in this case. Issue preclusion requires 
that "the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at hand" 
and that the issue "have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in a previous action." 
See Macris & Associates. Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1222 (Utah 2000.) In this 
17 
case, neither of those elements were satisfied. 
(i) No "identity of issues." The issue in this case involves whether D.U. 
Company held title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins. 
That issue was not before the Court in the Jenkins5 divorce action. The issue in the Jenkins' 
divorce action was how the marital assets were to be divided between Sam and Elaine 
Jenkins. The Divorce Decree was entered based on a stipulation that "the parties acquired 
no other real property during the course of the marriage" and therefore no further property 
division between Sam and Elaine Jenkins was required. The issue as to whether D. U. 
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine 
Jenkins was not "identical" to the issue in the divorce action. 
To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result that, where parties to a divorce 
proceeding fail to list all of the real property that they own in a divorce decree, the parties 
are thereafter "barred" from claiming ownership in that property. In other words, where 
parties to a divorce action fail to list all the property they own in a divorce decree, their 
ownership interest "disappears." 
This would also lead to the absurd result that a third-party (in this case D.U. 
Company) would suddenly receive a windfall - title to property that it never owned and 
never paid for. Should Alan Jenkins' suggested application of this rule be followed, D.U. 
Company would now own both legal and equitable title to property that it did not pay for 
and did not own, and would be able to sell that property and keep the sales proceeds simply 
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because the true owners had failed to list all the property they owned in a divorce 
proceeding.10 
(ii) Not competently, fully and fairly litigated. The issue as to whether D.U. 
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins was also 
not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated" in the divorce action. The Divorce Decree was 
entered by stipulation, not judicial adjudication. "An issue determined by stipulation rather 
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an 
intention to that effect." Id. at 1223. (Emphasis added.) See also 18 Charles A. Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedures § 4443, at 382 
(1981) ("Issue preclusion does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended 
that the issue be foreclosed in other litigation." (Emphasis added.)) 
The required intent by Elaine Jenkins was never demonstrated in this case. Before 
signing the stipulation, Elaine Jenkins specifically asked her attorney whether signing the 
stipulation would adversely affect her ability to make a claim to her ownership interest in 
the Redwood Road House. Elaine Jenkins signed the stipulation based on the understanding 
that signing the stipulation would not adversely affect her ability to establish ownership of 
the Redwood Road House in the future, should the need arise. Elaine Jenkins testified that 
had she understood that her signing of the stipulation would have had that effect (i.e., barred 
10In this case, having lost his ownership in the Redwood Road House, Alan Jenkins has 
the right to recover from D.U. Company the purchase price he paid to D.U. Company. D.U. 
Company did not have the right to sell Alan Jenkins the Redwood Road House, and was unjustly 
enriched by receiving proceeds from the sale of property that it did not own. 
19 
her right to claim her ownership interest in the future), she would have never signed the 
stipulation. Accordingly, the issue as to whether D.U. Company held legal title to the 
Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins was never "completely, fully, and fairly 
litigated" in the Jenkins5 divorce action. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION 
TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE. 
On June 2, 2006, Alan Jenkins filed a Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant, 
seeking to amend his Answer to add for the first time the affirmative defense of the four-year 
statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code. Alan Jenkins claims 
that the trial court "abused its discretion" in denying that motion, and claims that the reason 
for the court denying defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend is "not apparent from the 
record." Appellant's Brief, pg 18. However, Alan Jenkins failed to transcribe the Court's 
ruling from the bench at the hearing at which Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of 
Defendant was denied. Alan Jenkins is required to obtain a "transcript of all evidence 
relevant" to the appeal the trial court's denial of that motion and "[n] either the court nor the 
appellees is obligated to correct appellants deficiencies in providing the relevant portion of 
the transcript:" 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusions unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(c)(2). 
Alan Jenkins was required to "include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant" to 
the Court's denial of his Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant, and failed to do so. 
Accordingly, Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be denied on this basis alone. 
Elaine Jenkins has obtained a transcript of the trial court's ruling on August 14,2006 
on Alan Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant. The trial court denied Alan 
Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant on the grounds that it was untimely, that 
a late amendment would prejudice plaintiff and that Alan Jenkins had given no "good 
reason" for the delay: 
[w]e have a trial set. It is coming right up; 60 days is not a very 
long amount of time before the trial is set. Actually this was -
we doubled to set this first as a first-place setting and then as a 
second-place setting. 
We've passed the second-place setting on - with my 
determination that not enough time had been - first place had 
gone to - or to second place had gone to first place; and I didn't 
feel it was enough time, given the fact that this is a Jury trial, 
with the lists and so forth of witnesses; and- that have been 
designated as witnesses. 
So this is really a continue, if you will, or a second - a second 
setting for this case; and we're coming right up onto it. So I 
don't' know there's much question here that your request is not 
timely, given that; and your argument, Mr. Kingston, that I had 
permitted the plaintiff to amend, I'm not giving that much 
weight for this reason. We - 1 did that in August of last year, a 
year ago and more. Actually a year and coup - and a week. I 
think it was August the 5th with the second request to amend. 
So it's been a year since we did that. 
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All these time periods have passed, including the submission of 
witness lists and so forth. The matter's in place. So it seems to 
me that this is untimely. Although I appreciate, Mr. Kingston, 
your representation that this really is not going to require a great 
deal of discovery and so forth, if any, I don't know that I can 
come to that same conclusion. 
Apparently you have become aware of this as a result of 
information that has come to your attention. Seems to me that 
we're really hard pressed to tell Mr. Cline that "You better be 
prepared for this affirmative defense," without conducting 
much - without opening that up. Of course, if I open up 
discovery, then I've got to open it up, and all the rest of it. 
So it seems to me that because this motion is not timely, and 
because I really don't have a good reason why this motion is 
untimely, given the fact that we did have a discovery period and 
so forth, that your motion is respectfully denied. 
Transcript of August 14, 2006 hearing, pp 13-15.11 
The trial court found that the motion was not timely — "I don't know there's much question 
here that your request is not timely." Id. The trial court found that Alan Jenkins had not 
given any reason for the untimely motion - "I really don't have a good reason why this 
motion is untimely." Id. The trial court also found that plaintiff would be prejudiced if the 
motion was granted - "It seems to me that we're really hard pressed to tell Mr. Cline that 
"you better be prepared for this affirmative defense, without conducting much - without 
opening [up discovery.]" Id Accordingly, the trial court gave three reasons for denying 
defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend, none of which were addressed by Alan Jenkins in 
1
 Elaine Jenkins filed a Motion to Supplement the Record to include this transcript as part 
of the record. As of the date this brief was filed there had been no ruling on that motion. The 
transcript has been included with the rest of the record. 
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his brief. For this reason as well, Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be denied. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING 
ALAN JENKINS JURY INSTRUCTION. 
Alan Jenkins offered eight Jury instructions which were rejected by the trial court. 
Four instructions related to the statute of frauds, two related to issue preclusion, one related 
to the four year statute of limitations and one related to a cause of action for adverse 
possession. 
A. Standard of Review. 
An appellate court may reverse and remand on the basis of a challenge to Jury 
instructions only if it finds that the refusal to give the requested Jury instructions was 
reversible error and that error caused prejudice to the complaining party. State v. Stringham, 
17 P.3d 1153, 1157 (Utah App. 2001), see also State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d988, 990 (Utah 
App. 1993) and Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995). 
Reversible error may be found only if the omission of the requested Jury instructions 
tended to mislead the Jury, or insufficiently or erroneously advised the Jury on the law. 
Stringham, at 1157. Prejudice to the complaining party may be found only if there is a 
"reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable 
to the complaining party." Tingev v. Christensen. 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999), see also 
Cox v. State, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah App. 1988.) 
The Court of Appeals has held that reversible error may not be found if the reviewing 
court finds one of the following. First, reversible error may not be found if the instructions, 
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read as a whole, fairly instructed the Jury on the applicable law. Normandeau v. Hanson 
Equip., Inc., 174 P.3d 1,10-11 (Utah App. 2007). Second, if the requested instructions were 
properly covered in the other approved instructions. Id And, third, if the requested 
instructions did not accurately state the applicable law. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 
(Utah 1991.) 
B. Failure to Adequately Brief. 
Alan Jenkins has devoted almost no discussion as to why the trial court errored in 
refusing to give the eight requested Jury instructions. The entire discussion is 3 Vi pages. 
No statutes or case law is cited. None of the eight Jury instructions are set forth in whole 
or in part in the text. Appellant has the burden of providing a sufficient legal basis for 
granting his appeal. Alan Jenkins has inadequately briefed this issue for the Court by failing 
to provide any legal analysis or authority to support his claim of reversible error and 
prejudice. According to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, briefs must 
contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure places the burden upon the appellant to properly brief the issues for 
review. See Utah R. App. P. 24. "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court.'" Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, f 8, 995 P.2d 14 (citation omitted.) 
The appellate court may decline to address an issue on this ground alone. Bearden vs. 
Wardlev Corporation, 72 P.3d 144, ftnt 4 (Utah 2003.) Appellant's brief on this issue is 
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clearly inadequate because it fails to cite a single legal authority and the arguments, based 
solely on factual recitations, are completely devoid of any legal analysis. Appellee should 
not be placed in the position of having to draft a responsive brief when the reasons for 
appellant requesting reversal are unclear. 
Under Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "briefs that are not in 
compliance with Rule 24 may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte by the Court." Id. 
Thus, this Court may properly disregard this issue because it has been inadequately briefed 
and affirm the trial court's refusal to give the requested instructions. See State v. Herrera. 
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995). Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be dismissed on 
this grounds alone. 
In the event the Court finds that Appellant has adequately briefed this issue, the trial 
court did not error in denying Alan Jenkins' proposed Jury instructions. 
C. Refusal to Give the Requested Instructions was not Reversible Error. 
1. Four Statute of Frauds instructions. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court 
errored in refusing to submit the following four Jury instructions, all of which relate to the 
statute of frauds: 
A person claiming an interest in real property, must be able to 
evidence that interest by a deed or conveyance in writing, 
signed by the entity or person from whom that person claims to 
have acquired the interest. If there is no such deed or 
conveyance in writing, under the law, the person has no 
enforceable interest in the property. 
R. 298. 
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"Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. An 
agreement for the sale of land is void and unenforceable unless 
the agreement or some note or memorandum of the agreement 
is in writing, signed by the party selling the land. 
R. 300. 
There is an exception to the law that a person claiming an 
interest in real property must be able to evidence that interest by 
a deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or person 
from whom that person claims to have acquired the interest. To 
qualify for the exception, Elaine Jenkins must prove by clear 
and positive proof that there was an agreement between her and 
the property owner that the property would be transferred to her 
if she performed certain conditions, the agreed condition must 
be established with certainty and you must find that she did in 
fact perform those conditions pursuant to the agreement. 
R.299. 
In order to find that Elaine Jenkins performed or partially 
performed an agreement whereby she would obtain title to the 
real property in question, even though there is no written 
document evidencing such an agreement, you must find that the 
owner of the property agreed that upon the performance of 
certain actions, the property would be transferred to her; that 
there was a meeting of the minds between the owner of the 
property and Elaine Jenkins as to what those certain actions 
were that she was to perform and that she did in fact perform 
those actions. 
R. 304. 
(i) Inapplicable. The foregoing instructions, as drafted, are inapplicable since, 
as a matter of law, the statute of frauds does not apply to a transaction that has already 
occurred. It is undisputed that Elaine Jenkins property interest in the Redwood Road House, 
was created, if at all, in 1986. 
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Furthermore, the instructions incorrectly assume that the conveyance of the Redwood 
Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of the Jenkins has not yet taken place and that 
D.U. Company was the "property owner." Alan Jenkins claims that Elaine Jenkins must 
prove "that there was an agreement between her and the property owner that the Property 
would be transferred to her if she performed certain conditions." R. 299, 304 (Emphasis 
added.) In this case, the previous "property owner" was Gordon Berg, and he transferred 
the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins in 
1986. D.U. Company was never the "property owner" since it never received more than 
bare legal title, with the beneficial (or ownership) interest belonging to the Jenkins. Elaine 
Jenkins sought to quiet title to a property interest conveyed to her in 1986, not in some future 
conveyance. "[T]he trial court may properly refuse to give the requested instructions where 
it does not accurately reflect the law governing the factual situation of the case." Black vs. 
McKnight 562 P.2d 621, 621 (Utah 1977.) 
(ii) Misstates the law. Those Jury instructions misstate the law as to the statute 
of frauds. If there was an "agreement," "part or full performance" and "reliance" thereon, 
the statute of frauds no longer applies. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998). This 
exception is not stated in Alan Jenkins' proposed instructions. 
(iii) Unnecessary. The foregoing exception to the statute of frauds was 
necessarily satisfied if the Jury answered Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively. In answering 
Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively, the Jury found that, in 1986, at the time the Redwood 
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Road House was transferred to D.U. Company, "Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company 
intended that D.U. Company hold legal title to that property for the benefit of Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins." Once the Jury answered Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively, the Jury also 
necessarily found that the full or partial performance exception to the statute of frauds 
applied in this case. 
(iv) Covered in other instructions. The trial court did not commit reversible 
error when it refused to give these proposed instructions to the Jury because the legal correct 
part of these instructions (i.e., the part that did not misstate the law) was properly covered 
in the other approved instructions. As discussed above, there is no reversible error if the 
trial court rejects requested instructions that were fully covered in the other instructions 
given. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Utah App. 2007.) The 
legally correct portions of these requested instructions focus exclusively on the Jury's 
determination of whether an agreement was made between appellee and D.U. Company. 
Though with fewer words, approved Jury instruction number 14 covered the same 
applicable instructions and law contained in those instructions. Instruction number 14 
stated, "You must decide whether there was an agreement between Sam and Elaine Jenkins 
and D.U. Company pursuant to which D.U. Company was holding legal title to the property 
at 1074 Redwood Road for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins." It has been held that a 
party is not entitled "to have the Jury instructed with any particular wording." RL at 11. 
Therefore, because Jury instruction number 14 properly covered, though not in appellant's 
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particular wording, the applicable instructions and law contained in those instructions, the 
trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to give them. 
(v) No prejudice. Even if the trial court's refusal to give Alan Jenkins 
requested Jury instructions was error (which it was not), Alan Jenkins has the burden of 
further demonstrating that failure to give the requested instructions was reversible error. In 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc.. 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999), the Court held that refusal 
to give a Jury instruction is reversible error only if "there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable to the complaining party:" 
We have previously stated the circumstances in which a refusal 
to give a Jury instruction is reversible error: 
We may reverse a trial court judgment only if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have 
been a result more favorable to the complaining party. The 
failure to give an instruction to which a party is entitled may 
constitute reversible error only if it tends to mislead the Jury to 
the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or 
erroneously advises the Jury on the law. 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc.. 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999). Id at 974 [citations 
omitted.] 
Alan Jenkins has not argued how the omission of these requested instructions 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial in favor of appellee. "Even if we find an error, however, 
we will reverse only if defendant [appellant] shows reasonable probability the error affected 
the outcome of his case." State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d 988,990 (Utah App. 1993). Appellant 
has failed to do this. Even if he had attempted such an argument in his brief, it would have 
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been unpersuasive. The outcome of the trial depended on that Jury's finding of whether an 
agreement was made between Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company pursuant to which 
D.U. Company would hold legal title to the Property for their benefit. Given that the Jury 
did find that an agreement was made, the threshold question then becomes, would the Jury 
have found differently if these instructions had been given to them? The answer is no 
because the finding of an agreement necessarily exempts the transaction from the application 
of the statute of frauds. Therefore, appellant has failed to show, or to even argue that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more 
favorable to him. The trial court's refusal to give these instructions did not cause prejudice 
to appellant. 
2. Two Estoppel Jury Instruction. Alan Jenkins claims that two "estoppel" 
instructions should have been given to the Jury: 
When a person, by her acts or conducts, voluntarily causes 
another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, 
and thereby induces him to act on that belief so as to change his 
previous condition, the person inducing such belief will be 
estopped from afterwards denying the existence of such state of 
things, to the prejudice of the person so action. 
R.303. 
A party cannot adopt a position in a subsequent lawsuit contrary 
to a position ruled upon by the court in a previous lawsuit. If 
you find that in Elaine Jenkins' previous divorce action, she 
took the position that she did not own the property in question 
and that the court ruled in a final judgment that she did not own 
the property, then you must find against her on the claim she 
now makes in this lawsuit that she does own the property. 
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R. 305. 
(i) Inapplicable. The first Jury instruction (R. 303) is inapplicable since Alan 
Jenkins was not a party to the divorce action and therefore nothing Elaine Jenkins signed in 
the divorce action would have "induce[d] Alan Jenkins to [rely thereon] so as to change his" 
position. 
As to the second Jury instruction (R. 305), for the doctrine of "issue preclusion" to 
apply, the issue in the previous action must be identical to the issue in the present action and 
most have been "completely, fully and fairly litigated" in the previous action. See Macris 
& Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 121, 1222 (Utah 2000.) The second Jury 
instruction is inapplicable since, as a matter of law, the issue in the divorce action was not 
identical to the issue in this action. Furthermore, because the Divorce Decree was based on 
a stipulation, the issue of whether legal title to the Redwood Road House was held by D.U. 
Company for the benefit of the Jenkins was not, as a matter of law, "completely, fully and 
fairly litigationed" in the divorce action. These issues were previously discussed on pages 
17-20. 
(ii) Misstates the law. For issue preclusion to apply, the issue in the prior case 
and in the present case must be "identical" and the issue must have been "fully, fairly and 
completely" litigated in the prior action. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 
P.3d 121, 1222 (Utah 2000.) Neither of these requirements are included in Alan Jenkins5 
proposed Jury instructions. 
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(iii) No prejudice. Finally, Alan Jenkins fully argued this issue at trial, in its 
proper context, as evidence that the Jenkins and D.U. Company did not intend that D.U. 
Company acquire and hold title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins: 
I want you to take a closer look at P-9 [the Divorce Decree], 
which is the stipulation for divorce. You'll see that everything 
that does normally occur at any divorce action would be 
acquitted in that stipulation. All the property is divided, the 
assets are divided, the provisions made for the recitation of the 
children and so on. 
Again, do you really believe that a divorce attorney would give 
advice to his client, "Look, don't worry about that. You don't 
have to show that. You don't have to list that. You don't have 
to declare it." Of course, if she talks about missing witnesses. 
Do you think that she could get that attorney to come in here 
and acknowledge that she gave that kind of information or 
advice? 
R. 386, pp. 521-22. 
As far as the divorce attorney saying, "Well, let's not worry 
about them now; let's take it up later," a divorce would be the 
time to take care of all the issues on property ownership. That's 
where you do it. That's why you have the divorce; so you can 
decide who owns what, who has to pay what bills, who has 
rights to the children and so on. It's not something an attorney 
would say, "We don't have to deal with that now; we'll just deal 
with it later. We're just going to tell the Court right now, we 
don't own any property." 
R. 386, p. 533. 
Alan Jenkins argued that Elaine Jenkins' testimony regarding statements by her divorce 
attorney were unbelievable - "[D]o you really believe that a divorce attorney would give 
advise to his clients...you don't have to list [the Redwood Road House]." Id at 522. "It's 
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not something an attorney would say, 'We don't have to deal with that now, we'll just deal 
with it later. We're just going to tell the Court right now, we don't own any property.'" IdL 
at 533. Alan Jenkins argued to the Jury that Sam and Elaine Jenkins' failure to include the 
Redwood Road House as a marital asset in the Divorce Decree was evidence that the Jenkins 
did not own any interest in the Redwood Road Property. Alan Jenkins made his argument 
to the Jury, and the Jury found to the contrary. Accordingly, Alan Jenkins has failed to 
demonstrate that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the Jury would have reached a 
more favorable result if the proposed instruction had been given. See Robinson vs. All-Star 
Delivery. Inc.. 992 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 1999.) 
3. Statute of Limitations Instructions. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court 
errored in failing to give the following Jury instruction on the four-year statute of limitations 
to the Jury: 
There is a four year statute of limitations that governs the 
recovery of real property held by a person other than the owner 
of the property. This means that in order to recover property 
held in trust by another entity, the true owner must file suit to 
recover the property within four years from the time she 
discovers that the property was not in her name. Elaine Jenkins 
claims that although Alan Jenkins holds legal title to the 
property. If you find that Elaine Jenkins did pay for the subject 
property, in order to prevail on this claim, Elaine Jenkins must 
show that she did not learn that the property was in someone's 
name other than hers and Sam's until a date less than four years 
from the date she filed the Complaint in this case. If you find 
that Elaine Jenkins knew that the title to the property in question 
was held in someone's name other than hers or Sam's more than 
four years before she filed the lawsuit in this case, you must 
find in favor of Alan Jenkins. 
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R. 301. 
(i) Inapplicable. The four year statute of limitations is found in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-25(3). Alan Jenkins did not raise that statute of limitations in his 
Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. See R. 166-172. The four year statute of 
limitations is inapplicable because it was not raised as an affirmative defense. If an 
affirmative defense is not raised, it is waived. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
("A party waives all defenses and objections not presented by motion or by answer or 
reply."); Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558 (UT 2000) (statute of limitations that was not raised 
in Answer was waived); Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 2 P.2d 107 (Utah 1931) (statute of 
limitations that was not raised in Answer was waived.) In June, 2006, Alan Jenkins tried to 
amend his Answer to include this statute of limitations as a defense, but that motion was 
denied. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying that motion has been 
previously discussed. 
(ii) Misstates the law. Even if that instruction was applicable (which it is not), 
that instruction ailso misstates the law. The instruction states that "Elaine Jenkins must show 
that she did not learn that the [Redwood Road House] was in someone else's name other 
than hers until a date less than four years from the date she filed the Complaint." That is not 
correct. Elaine Jenkins has known that the Redwood Road House was not in her name since 
the date it was purchased in 1986. Since 1986, Elaine Jenkins has believed that D.U. 
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of herself (and Sam.) 
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Because D.U. Company held legal title for the benefit of the Jenkins, it was not until D.U. 
Company sold the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins in 2005 that Elaine Jenkins' claim 
arose. Elaine Jenkins immediately filed a Complaint. 
(iii) No prejudice. As previously discussed, Alan Jenkins has failed to provide 
any discussion as to a "reasonable likelihood" that giving the requested instruction would 
have resulted in a "more favorable verdict." Even if the requested instruction had been 
given, the verdict would have been the same. 
4. Adverse possession instruction. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court errored 
in failing to give the following Jury instruction to the Jury: 
The occupation of real property by someone other than the 
person who established legal title to the property is deemed to 
be under and by the authority of the person establishing legal 
title, unless the person occupying the property can show that she 
has occupied the property for at least seven years and that 
during that seven year period, she has paid all of the taxes 
levied and assessed against the property. Unless you find that 
Elaine Jenkins has paid all of the real property taxes assessed 
against the property for seven consecutive years, and that such 
payment was not paid to the property owner as partial rent or 
consideration for the right to use of the property under a rental 
agreement, you must find in favor of Alan Jenkins. 
R. 302. 
(i) Inapplicable. This instruction is based on Utah Code Sections 78-12-7 and 
78-12-12. See citation at the bottom of R. 302. Those statutes relate to the "recovery" of 
real property in an adverse possession action, during which the claimant has paid property 
taxes for seven years. This is not a "recovery" action since Elaine Jenkins is not trying to 
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"recovery" title from D.U. Company. Elaine Jenkins is trying to "quiet title" as to what 
already exists - that D.U. Company has held legal title for Jenkins since the property was 
acquired in 1986. This instruction was inapplicable since Elaine Jenkins did not file a claim 
for adverse possession. No claim for adverse possession was heard by the Jury. 
(ii) Misstates the law. Alan Jenkins claims that "occupation of real property 
by someone other than" the record title holder is deemed to be "under the authority o f the 
legal title holder unless that person has paid taxes for seven years. That is not the law. 
Elaine Jenkins theory of recovery was that the Redwood Road House was held by D.U. 
Company for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins. See, e.g.. Park vs. Zions First National Bank, 
673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983.) Alan Jenkins has not challenged that theory of recovery. The 
fact that D.U. Company held legal title does not mean that the Jenkins occupied the 
Redwood Road House "under the authority" of D.U. Company, since D.U. Company held 
legal title for the benefit of the Jenkins. 
That instruction also states that "unless you find that Elaine Jenkins paid all of the 
real property taxes assessed against the property for seven years. . . you must find in favor 
of Alan Jenkins." Again, that is not the law. While Sam and Elaine Jenkins did pay 
property taxes through debits from their account with Davis County Cooperative Society, 
Elaine Jenkins did not proceed under an "adverse possession" theory. Where D.U. Company 
held title to the property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins, a finding that "Elaine 
Jenkins paid all of the real property taxes assessed against the property for seven years" was 
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not necessary to find in favor of Elaine Jenkins. 
(iii) No prejudice. As previously discussed, Alan Jenkins has failed to provide 
any discussion as to a "reasonable likelihood" that giving the requested instruction would 
have resulted in "more favorable verdict." Even if the requested instruction had been given, 
the verdict would have been the same. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Alan Jenkins appeal should be denied and Elaine Jenkins 
should be awarded her costs for defending this matter on appeal. 
DATED this 3 day of July, 2008. 
RUSSELL A. CLINE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,3 day of July, 2008,1 mailed two copies of 
the foregoing to: 
Carl E. Kingston 
3212 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
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ADDENDUM A 
cb 
SAM & SLAIN3 JENKINS PROPERTY 
UNITS USING JAN.1,1954 
STEWARDSHIP PERSONAL 
3-usiness Clotning for Resale 
House 
Green House 
19/1 Van 
1965 Van 
Bee Supplies 
V¥ 
1973 Olds 
1973 Suburban 
?973Buick Sta. Wagon 
PSRSONAL PROPERTY 
Fridge 
Fruit Trees 
Furniture 
Toys for Resale 
Hoped 
Bosch 
2459 
400 
550 
75 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
40000.00 
150.00 
50.00 
200.00 
2218.00 
200.00 
150.00 
80.00 
100.00 
150.00 
270.00 
STEWARDSHIP DECREASE 
TOTAL PR0P3RTY DECREASE. 
3484.50 
2300.00 
1184.50 
$37.00 
43568.00 
UNITS USING JAN.1,1985 
STEWARDSHIP PERSONAL 
2000.00 
200.00 
100.00 
2300.00 
PERSONAL INCREASE. 
40000.00 
100.00 
25.00 
1500.00 
2200.00 
80.00 
100.00 
200.00 
44205.00 
43568.00 
637.00 
547.50 
DAT1 
TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE 547-50 
PL 4.800.30 
DEBTS FROM 1984 STATEMENTS 2,05°.49 
BALANCE INCREASE LESS DEBTS 2,193-01 
PLACED IN RESERVE 219-30 
BALANCE INCREASE LESS RESERVE 1,973-71 
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1984 __43.78Q.53 
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN 1, I985 45,763.24 
STEWARDSHIP UNITS USING 1985 2^00.00 ' ' 
PERSONAL. UNITS USING i/l/85 44205.00 
TOTAL, UNITS USING JAN 1, 1985 46,505.00 
TOTAL UNITS PAYING SERV CHG ON FOR 1985 74l.?6 
J <2> # Q) 
3,262.97 less 4,800.00 plus 2,059-49 plus 219.30 
equals 741.76 s 
SIGNATURE 
DATE 
I, or we, the undersigned hereby declare that this inventory 
and balance sheet as stated, is true and accurate that I will pay 
the balance due ( sr.cwing as unts paying service charge on) on derand 
oJ-UNidj _Ii J.J-1L /-hi^iENwr, Or : SIC-NATTJRE 
SAM & 3LSIN3 JENKINS PROPERTY cb 
UNITS USING 
STEWARDSHIP 
Business*Clothing /Resale 2000.00 
House 
Green House 
VW 
1973 Suburban 
1973 Buick Sta. Wagon 200.00 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Furniture 
Toys f o r Resa le 100.00 
Moped 
Bosch 
2300.00 
1200.00 
STEWARDSHIP DECREASE 1100.00 
PERSONAL DECF3A3S,.. 
TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE. 
JAN.1,1985 
PERSONAL 
40000.00 
100.00 
25.00 
1500.00 
2200.00 
80,00 
100.00 
200.00 
44205.00 
UNITS USING 
STEWARDSHIP 
1000.00 
100.00 
100.00 
1200.00 
Acc .Payable.. 
38305.00 m 
JAN.1,1986 
PERSONAL 
40000.00 
100.00 
25.00 
1000.00 
2200.00 
80.00 
100.00 
200.00 
43705.00 
..5400.00 
5900.00 
1100.00 
38305.00 
• • • • 
7000.00 
DUE ANNETTE MORGAN FOR TOYS 44.29 
NOTE PAYMENTS 1935 $ 4800.00 
DEBTS FROM 1985 STATEMENTS 388.77 
DECREASE IN PROPERTY 7000.00 
D31REA33 PLUS DEBTS LESS NOTE PYMT $^Z63^Il6^\< 
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN. 1,1985 .".. '/" 45763.24 \ 
TOTAL UNITS OWMED JAN. 1,1986 ( .$ 4J130.18 J 
STEWARDSHIP UNITS B3ING JAN.1,1986. .$ 1 2 0 0 . 0 0 - - ' " • 
PERSONAL UNITS JAN. 1,1986 3830«5.00 39505.00 - J 
UNITS RECEIVING SERVING 3HASg3 ON FOR 1986 S 3&25.18 
$741.?6 p l u s $383.77 minus $4800.00 p l u s 44 .29 e q u a l s $3625-18 
DATI SIGNATURE 
DATS 
I , or we, t h e unders igned do hereby_ 
my u n i t s a s shown above, i n zhe fo l lowing manner 
SIGNED ?H3 PRESENCE OF: SIGNATURE 
SAM & ELAINE JENKINS' PROPERTY 
UNITS USING JAN.1,1987 
STEWARDSHIP PERSONAL 
UNITS USING J AN.1,1988 
Business Clothing-Resale 
House 
Green House 
YW 
1973 Suburban 
1973 Buick Sta Wagon 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Furniture 
Toys for Resale 
Hoped 
Bosch 
House Redwood Road 
1981 Datsun 210 
1000.00 
100.00 
100.00 
1200.00 
.00 
40000.00 
100.00 
25.00 
1000.00 
2200.00 
80.00 
100.00 
200.00 
50000.00 
93,705.00 
54.130.00 
.00 
100.00 
500.00 
2300.00 
80.00 
100.00 
50.00 
50000.00 
1000.00 
54,130.00 
STEWARDSHIP DECREASE.. 1200.00 39,575.00 
1.200.00 
TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE .40,775.00 
DECREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
PL. 
INCREASE FROM 1987 STATEMENTS 
DUE FROM WCTS FOR 3 MO INTEREST ON HOUSE 
STATEMENT INCREASE PLUS DUE FROM WCTS 
DUE TO WCF PROP TAXES 85 THRU MAY 87 
BALANCE INCREASE 
DECREASE IN PROPERTY 
BALANCE DECREASE 
UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1987 
UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1988 
UNITS USING JAN 1, 1988 
UNITS PAYING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR 1988 
y S 
v/40,464.65 less 34,150.38 less 1,200.00 plus 844.31 
' 4,800.00 equals 1,158.58 
4,800.00 
34,150.38 
1,200.00 
*K),150.38 
844.31 
40,775.00 
1,468.93 
54,440.35 
52,971.42 
54,130.00 
1,158.58 
less 
DATE SIGNATURE 
DATE 
I, the undersigned do hereby declare that this inventory and 
balance sheet as stated is true and accurate, that I will pay the 
balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand. 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: SIGNATURE 
^ENWNSrSAM'irELAlNfc Property VS 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Green house 
it |3§uburbjn 
Mop«i 
jJeuffRftdwood Road 
19t$^T0y0t« 
I960 ChevelH 
Payables Sam 
Payables Elaine 
JJrdU Using 
Stewardship 
1-Jsn-00 
Personal 
$2,400.00 
50.00 
500.00 
80.00 
50.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50.000,00 
300.00 
100.00 
400.00 
800.00 
100.00 
(13,770.00) 
(21,402.00) 
Units 
Sitwj j 
Using 
rdshlp 
1-Jan-91 
Personal 
$2,400.00 
50.00 
500.00 
80.00 
50.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50,000.00 
300.00 
100.00 
400.00 
800.00 
100.00 
(13,770.00) 
(21.402.00) 
$0 
E / DECREASE IN PROPERTY 
DECFEASEFFDW1990 STATEMENT 
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY 
INCREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
TOTAL INCREASE IN PROPERTY 
BALANCE DECREASE FOR 1990 
BALANCE DECREASE 
TR2 
TOTAL UNITS A 1-Jan-90 
TOTAL UNI1S& 1-Jan*91 
TOTAL UNITS llsiNQ 1 -Jan-91 
UNITS PAYING INTEREST ON FOR 
$192,43 + ($3,583.66) 
DATE. 
$.00 $19,668.00 $.00 
.00 
$.00 
_ 40_ 
1991 
+ $.00 + $1,164 80 * ($2,226.43) 
SIGNATURE 
$19,668.00 
19,668.00 
$.00 
$.00 
($3,583.66) 
.00 
.00 
.00 
(3,583.66) 
.00 
(3,583.66) 
1,164.80 
19 860 43 
17.441.57 
19.668.00 
($2,226.43) 
DATE 
I or we the Undersigned hereby declare that this Inventory and balance sheet as stated is true and accurate, 
that I will pay the balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand. 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF* SIGNATURE: 
Page 1 
JENKINS, SAM & ELAINE Property LVK 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1973 Suburban 
Furniture 
Moped 
Bosch 
House Redwood Road 
1963 Dodge Dart 
1976 Dodge Dart 
1976 Toyota 
1966 Chevelle 
1964 Dodge Dart(bad engine) 
Payables Sam 
Payables Elaine 
VW Rabbit 
Trailer Van Dyke 
Trailer Tammarac H 
Dodge Van 
Units Using 1-Jan-94 
Stewardship Personal 
$2,500.00 
500.00 
80.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50,000.00 
100.00 
500.00 
500.00 
100.00 
50.00 
(13,770.00) 
(21,402.00) 
Units Using 
Stewardship 
1-Jan-95 
Personal 
$2,500.00 
500.00 
80.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50,000.00 
100.00 
500.00 
50.00 
100.00 
50.00 
(13,770.00) 
(21,402.00) 
200.00 
800.00 
300.00 
1.800.00 
$0 $.00 
INCREASE / DECREASE IN PROPERTY 
$19,218.00 $.00 
.00 
$.00 
$21,868.00 
19,218.00 
$2,650.00 
PL $.00 
DECREASE FROM 1994 STATEMENT ($1,050.52) 
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY .00 
INCREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 2,650.00 
TOTAL INCREASE IN PROPERTY 2,650.00 
.00 
.00 
BALANCE INCREASE FOR 1994 1,599.48 
PR ( t59 .95) 
BALANCE INCREASE LESS PIR FOR 1,439.53 
.00 
TOTAL UNITS A 1 -Jan-94 19,428.14 
TOTAL UNITS A 1-Jan-95 20,867.67 
TOTAL UNITS USING 1 -Jan-95 21,868.00 
UNITS PAYING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR 1995 ($1,000.33) 
$210.14 ($1,050.52) + ($159.95) + $.00 = ($1,000.33) 
DATE SIGNATURE 
DATE 
I or we the undersigned hereby declare that this inventory and balance sheet as stated is true and accurate, 
that I will pay the balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand. 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: SIGNATURE: 
Page 1 
JENKINS, SAM & ELAINE Property KK 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1973 Suburban 
Furniture 
Moped 
Bosch 
House Redwood Road 
1963 Dodge Dart 
1976 Dodge Dart 
1976 Toyota 
1966 Chevelle 
1964 Dodge Dart(bad engine) 
Payables Sam 
Payables Elaine 
VW Rabbit 
Trailer Van Dyke 
frailer lammarach 
Dodge Van 
Units Using 
Stewardship 
1-Jan-95 
Personal 
$2,500.00 
500.00 
80.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50,000.00 
100.00 
500.00 
50.00 
100.00 
50.00 
(13,770.00) 
(21,402.00) 
200.00 
800.00 
3C0.CC 
Units Using 
Stewardship 
1-Jan-96 
Personal 
$2,500.00 
80.00 
10.00 
50.00 
50,000.00 
100.00 
500.00 
50.00 
100.00 
50.00 
(16,770.00) 
(21,402.00) 
50.00 
800.00 
1,800.00 1,600.00 
$ 0 $.00 
INCREASE / DECREASE IN PROPERTY 
$21,868.00 
17,71B.OO 
($4,150.00) 
$.00 
.00 
$.00 
$17,718.00 
PL $.00 
INCREASEFROM 1995 STATEMENT $1,186.41 
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY .00 
DECREASE IN PERSONALPROPERTY (4,150.00) 
TOTAL DECREASE IN PROPERTY (4,150.00> 
TRTO LORIN JENKINS (3.24) 
,00 
BALANCE DECREASE FOR 1995 (2,966.83) 
BALANCE DECREASE (2,966.83) 
.00 
TOTAL UNITS A 1 -Jan-95 20,867.67 
TOTAL UNITS A 1 -Jan-96 17,900.84 
TOTAL UNnS USING 1 -Jan-96 17,718.00 
UNfTS RECEIVING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR 1996 $182.84 
($1,000.33) $1,186.41 ($3.24) + $.00 $182.84 
DATE SIGNATURE 
DATE, 
I, the undersigned do hereby __ my units as shown above, in the following manner: 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: SIGNATURE: 
Pagel 
